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Mark Kelly’s The Political Philosophy of Michel Foucault embarks on the formidable task of 
presenting Foucault’s thought as a coherent political philosophy.  It is formidable because of 
Foucault’s personal dislike of viewing his work as a coherent oeuvre, as well as the well-
known shifts that characterise the way in which his work developed.  Nevertheless, Kelly’s 
book manages to deliver on its promise and provides an interesting and convincing 
reconstruction of Foucault’s political philosophy suitable both for beginners and more 
advanced readers.  However, the stated scope of the book naturally limits the way it deals with 
Foucault’s less politically influenced writings, especially regarding his very early work.  The 
book is divided into seven laconically titled chapters dealing with key concepts essential to 
Foucault’s philosophy, making it very accessible and valuable for those looking for more 
information on specific elements of Foucault’s thought.  In what follows, I will go through the 
chapters in their chronological order focusing on what I consider to be some of their most 
interesting or controversial claims.  If the development of Foucault’s thought could be charac-
terised as a roller-coaster ride filled with abrupt twists and turns, Kelly’s main concern in his 
book is to make visible the tracks that guide it and constitute the fundamentals of his political 
ontology. 
 
Although Kelly claims that the first chapter of the book should be considered the least 
interesting in the book, I found it important because it explores the methodological 
foundations of Foucault’s political thought, about which Kelly also makes subsequent remarks 
in the latter chapters of the book.  The first chapter provides a reading of Foucault’s 
epistemology and ontological orientation, emphasising it’s their materialism. However, he 
makes it clear that Foucault’s materialism is of a very different order than what is generally 
understood as materialism, the difference of which is highlighted in Foucault’s archaeological 
writings on the concept of event and statement.  For Kelly, Foucault’s materialism of the 
incorporeal provides an ontological basis for his entire thought.  Furthermore, this materialism 
is reflected in Foucault’s epistemology, which emphasises the violent interconnection between 
discourse and extra-discursive reality. Ultimately, in Kelly’s opinion the notion of extra-
discursive reality with which discourse is in continuous contact constitutes ”a constant feature 
of Foucault’s thought.” (29) Though this, together with his later remarks on Foucault’s being a 
realist rather than a nominalist (86), might put Kelly at odds with those who tend to view 
Foucault as social constructionist, I found Kelly’s emphasis on the materialist aspects of 
Foucault’s thought important, especially against such interpretation that misleadingly 
exaggerates the discursive construction of things at the cost of neglecting the way how, for 
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instance, power relations operate in a very material way and are irreducible to language. 
 
The two subsequent chapters (chapter 2 and 3) deal with power and here Kelly provides some 
thought-provoking claims regarding Foucault’s conception of power.  First of all, Kelly sees 
Foucault’s way of developing his ideas of power as, ultimately, a trajectory towards a future 
theory of power, despite Foucault’s insistence on his method’s being opposed to theory.  
According to Kelly (34), Foucault’s scepticism is not directed at the possibility of a theory of 
power as such but rather on the possibility of forming an a priori theory of power without any 
empirical investigation.  In addition, in Kelly’s opinion Foucault’s account of power is ulti-
mately transhistorical.  But this does not mean that power would simply refer to some timeless 
substance existing outside history, but is instead something more complex than that.  Kelly 
acknowledges that Foucault emphasises the purely methodological role of concepts of power 
and knowledge, but also points out how power is related to a Nietzschean ontology that is 
based on a struggle between forces that form the conditions of the possibility of history. (39–
40)  This means that power is in a sense transcendental since it ultimately refers to relations of 
force that are in a state of constant flux and can only be studied through the different historical 
forms they happen to take.  Hence, changes in power do not happen at the level of its form but 
instead concern the modes it takes during different historical periods. (40)  
 
In the second chapter, on power, Kelly claims, in accordance with his earlier arguments about 
the transhistorical nature of power, that Foucault’s view of power is ultimately coherent.  Kelly 
here devotes especial attention to repudiating interpretations of Foucault that emphasise the 
meaning of the shift from Foucault’s views on power as warlike phenomena to his late 70’s 
emphasis on governmental forms of power, most notably made by such scholars  as Thomas 
Lemke.1  Pace Lemke, Kelly does not see this as implying two mutually exclusive models of 
power.  According to him, the shift from power as war to power as games where the adver-
saries are trying to conduct each other’s conduct happens merely at the metaphorical level and 
cannot be interpreted as a change in the models of power itself.  Instead, what can be seen as a 
basis for both modes of power can be found in the relation between forces as a condition of 
possibility for power relations to exist. (58–59)  Though Foucault drops the description of 
power as war after employing the notion of government, what is at stake according to Kelly is 
a more accurate re-elaboration of what was already presented earlier, since both war and 
government ultimately find their basis in a conception of power as a clash between forces.  
Kelly’s ultimate claim is that war and government should be considered as two different 
perspectives on power, the former being macroscopic, whereas the latter is ”microphysical.” 
(62)   This move from war to government is correctly interpreted by Kelly as a result of Fou-
cault’s growing interest in the state and its role in the network of power relations, a concern he 
had earlier bracketed when reacting against the Marxist tendency to privilege state power.  
However, Kelly notes that Foucault’s way of analysing the state from a governmental 
perspective is not intended to replace Marxist analysis but to function as a corrective to it. 
  
The chapter on subjectivity (chapter 4) is aimed against such interpretations of Foucault, 
                                                 
1  See Thomas Lemke, Eine Kritik der politischen Vernunft: Foucaults Analyse der modernen Gouvernemen-
talität,(Argument Verlag:: Hamburg/Berlin, GE, 1997). 
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recently presented, inter alia, by Eric Paras,2 which tend to claim that Foucault’s later 
philosophy is characterised by an abrupt repudiation of his earlier antihumanism and the 
introduction of a subject somehow external to power.  Though Kelly disagrees with Paras, the 
main target of his criticism, is, however, Judith Butler, whose Foucault sees the subject as a 
pure effect of power.  Kelly locates correctly Butler’s (mis)understanding of subjectivity in 
Foucault’s thought as originating from her tendency to equate subjectivation as an active 
process of self-constitution with the passive subjection (assujettissement) to power. (87–89)  
Kelly’s counter-argument emphasises the materiality of the subject by relying on a 
Nietzschean-Deleuzian under-standing of the body as composed of a multiplicity of sub-
individual forces that are folded upon themselves in subjectivation.  Kelly is quick to 
distinguish Foucault from Deleuze though and emphasises how Foucault’s demand for the 
promotion of new forms of subject-tivity is something different from Deleuzian 
deterritorialisation, since deterritorialisation presupposes that individuality is something that 
is harmfully imposed on us and hence ”*...+ constitutes a harking after an authentic existence 
(103),” which Kelly deems as alien to Foucault.  Instead of deterritorialisation Foucault, Kelly 
avers, is concerned about resisting the ways in which individualisation is governed.  Though I 
agree with Kelly that equating Foucaultian ethics with Deleuze’s would be misleading, I found 
his point here rushed, taking into consideration, for instance, the notion of an “outside 
thought” that Deleuze considered to be one of the key themes in Foucault’s philosophy and 
that also resonates, albeit uneasily, with certain Deleuzian themes.  Moreover, it could be 
questioned in my opinion, whether deterritorialisation really has authenticity as it goal.  In 
Kelly’s opinion, however, deterritorialisation is not compatible with Foucault’s interest in 
exploring ”unlimited possibilities of perpetrating violence against reality.” (148) 
Unfortunately, he does not elaborate the differences between Deleuze and Foucault any 
further, which leaves readers interested in both their mutual points of convergence and 
disagreements somewhat empty-handed.  However, a critical and exhaustive assessment of 
Deleuze’s way of interpreting Foucault is obviously outside the scope of Kelly’s book. 
 
The final chapters of the book are devoted to resistance (chapter 5), critique (chapter 6) and 
ethics (chapter 7).  Here Kelly examines resistance as something co-extensive but transversally 
opposed to power.  He argues how one of the key elements of power and resistance is the 
notion of will, which provides an element of unpredictability and purposeful resistance to 
power relations.  However, the notion of will should be understood in a relatively broad sense 
since even the sub-individual forces that form the subject have their own “wills.” (118) Kelly 
does not, however, dwell too much on this somewhat problematic notion, partly because of 
Foucault’s own ambiguity and reluctance to elaborating his way of using the term.  Most of the 
chapter on resistance is devoted to the problem of co-option which Kelly identifies operating 
in two different ways.  In the trivial sense co-option refers to the fact how all of our action are 
always born in a given socio-political milieu and will always be part of it.  However, this is to 
be distinguished from the dangerous form of co-option where supposed acts of resistance end 
up reproducing or supporting the relations they were meant to challenge.  Indeed, 
distinguishing between emancipatory resistance and co-opted resistance forms the 
fundamental task of Foucaultian critique. (123)  Now, resistance as emancipation does not 
mean getting rid of power as such but should be understood more narrowly as combating  
                                                 
2 See Eric Paras, Foucault 2.0. Beyond Power and Knowledge (New York, Other Press, 2006). 
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specific forms of domination that ossify power relations.  This also means that Foucaultian 
critique is hostile to all utopianism and does not have any need to subscribe to an alternative 
vision. (132)  Furthermore, critique plays a double-role depending on whether we are dealing 
with macroscopic or microscopic resistance.  From the macroscopic perspective critique has to 
do with analysing power relations, which is a task Foucault assigns to philosophy as an 
historical investigation of the relationship between politics and truth.  From the microscopic 
perspective critique is linked to ethical practice as a resistant response to forms of government 
that strive towards the creation of new modes of subjectivation.  Kelly locates two ways how 
the concept of ethics is employed in Foucault’s thought where ethics is characterised as 
“practices of self-relation,” as well as “permanent resistance.” (151) These two aspects, 
however, overlap when ethics encounters politics and, in Kelly’s opinion, ethics, as deliberate 
practices of self-formation, represents a solution to the problem of identifying subjection with 
subjugation by offering alternatives modes of subjection without recourse to scientific 
knowledge of the self. (158–159)  
  
Despite its relatively brief length, Political Philosophy of Michel Foucault is a thought-provoking 
elaboration of Foucault’s political thought. According to it, Foucault’s political philosophy is 
fundamentally coherent and guided by a materialism that is aimed to correct the shortcomings 
and misleading simplifications made in Marxist thought.  Indeed, though Kelly explicitly 
states how his intention is not to situate Foucault along the philosophical map, but instead to 
provide a reading of him in his own terms, it could be argued that sketching the relation 
between Marxism and Foucault’s political thought acts as an implicit motif in the book.  
Unfortunately Kelly does not attempt to elaborate the kind of Marxism it could be compatible 
with in a detailed manner.  Another concern I had with Kelly’s book was that it does not 
engage adequately with the relevance of Foucault’s political thought to our present, 
characterised, for instance, by Deleuze as a shift from disciplinary societies to societies of 
control. Analysing the benefits as well as the potential shortcomings of Foucaultian critique in 
relation to our own present in a more detailed manner would have provided an important 
addition to an otherwise informative and well-written book.  Nevertheless, Political Philosophy 
of Michel Foucault deals with one of the most important and immediate aspects of Foucault’s 
thought in an interesting manner and will be valuable to all those interested in Foucault and 
politics.  
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